Mental representation
Internal cognitive symbols representing external reality and abstractions.
Mental representation is a hypothetical internal cognitive symbol that represents external reality or its abstractions, central to philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science. It enables mental imagery of things not present to the senses and allows representing things never experienced or that do not exist.
- field
- Philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science
- known_for
- Hypothetical internal cognitive symbol representing external reality; basis of representational theory of mind
- key_concepts
- Mental imagery, representationalism, strong vs weak representationalism, intentional content, phenomenal character
Lore & Background
Mental representation is the mental imagery of things not actually present to the senses, enabling representation of things never experienced or that do not exist. Although visual imagery is more likely recalled, mental imagery may involve any sensory modality such as hearing, smell, or taste. Stephen Kosslyn proposes that images are used to help solve certain types of problems by visualizing objects and mentally representing the images.
Reader's Guide
The representational theory of mind, also known as indirect realism, postulates that mental representations act as intermediaries between the observing subject and external objects. This theory contrasts with naïve or direct realism. The classical version, traceable to Thomas Hobbes, held that representations were images or 'ideas.' Modern adherents like Jerry Fodor and Steven Pinker view the representational system as an internal language of thought (mentalese), with symbolic structures possessing syntax and semantics. Canadian philosopher P. Thagard noted that most cognitive scientists agree knowledge in the human mind consists of mental representations, and that people have mental procedures operating via these representations for thinking and action. Mental representations have recently been conceptualized as contents of episodic memory consolidated in long-term memory, which may emerge as conscious experiences during retrieval, though sufficient activation via thalamocortical pathways alone is not sufficient for generating conscious experiences.
Did You Know?
- Mental representations allow representing things that have never been experienced as well as things that do not exist.
- The classical representational theory probably traces back to Thomas Hobbes.
- Strong representationalism attempts to reduce phenomenal character to intentional content, while weak representationalism claims only that phenomenal character supervenes on intentional content.
- Moods are often cited as counterexamples to unrestricted representationalism because they appear to lack intentional content.
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